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The Protection of Civilians (PoC) in peacekeeping and the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) populations from atrocity crimes are two norms that emerged at 
the turn of the new millennium with the aim of protecting vulnerable peoples 
from mass violence and/or systematic and widespread violations of human rights. 
While R2P addresses a specific set of extreme situations in which any of four 
crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity) have been 
committed, PoC tackles a broader set of threats and is concerned with violence 
directed at civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings. To date, most scholars 
have analysed the evolution of discourse over the status, strength and robust-
ness of the two norms separately.1 Moreover, actors both within and outside the 
UN system have frequently insisted on their separation. And yet the distinction 
between the two norms has at times been exceptionally fine. The Security Council 
has made reference to R2P in the context of particular peacekeeping operations 
and, in the case of Libya in 2011, authorized enforcement action to protect civilians 
without explicit reference to R2P.
In this article we draw on the framework established by Stimmer and Wisken to 
analyse the joint evolution of PoC and R2P within the UN system and the related 
question of the discrepancy between their degree of institutionalization and actual 
state practice. The framework is valuable in that it distinguishes between discur-
sive and behavioural forms of contestation;2 identifies implementation access as a 
* This article was funded by the European Union’s Programme FP/2007-2013, Grant Agreement no. 340956– 
IOW. The authors wish to thank the editors of this special section, Anette Stimmer and Lea Wisken, for their 
insightful comments, as well as the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions.
1 On R2P, see Ramesh Thakur, ‘The Responsibility to Protect at 15’, International Affairs 92: 2, March 2016, pp. 
415–34; Philipp Rotmann, Gerrit Kurtz and Sarah Brockmeier, ‘Major powers and the contested evolution 
of a Responsibility to Protect’, Conflict, Security and Development 14: 4, 2014, pp. 355–77; Jennifer M. Welsh, 
‘Norm contestation and the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to Protect 5: 4, 2013, pp. 365–96; and 
Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Norm robustness and the Responsibility to Protect’, Journal of Global Security Studies 4: 1, 
2019, pp. 53–72. On PoC in peacekeeping, see Alex J. Bellamy and Charles T. Hunt, ‘Twenty-first century 
UN peace operations’, International Affairs 91: 6, Nov. 2015, pp. 1290–94; Emily Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides 
in peacekeeping: impartiality and the future of the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Several 
scholars examine the similarities and contrasts between R2P and PoC, including how these norms are viewed 
by different audiences. They do not, however, explicitly analyse their joint evolution. See Angus Francis, 
Vesselin Popovski and Charles Sampford, eds, Norms of protection: Responsibility to Protect, Protection of Civilians 
and their interaction (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012); Hugh Breakey, ‘Protection norms and 
human rights’, Global Responsibility to Protect 4: 3, 2012, pp. 309–33.
2 Stimmer and Wisken define discursive contestation as ‘debates about different understandings of the meaning 
and/or (relative) importance of a norm’, while behavioural contestation occurs ‘when the actions of relevant 
actors imply the existence of conflicting understandings of the meaning and/or (relative) importance of a 
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prerequisite for behavioural contestation;3 and posits norm ambiguity and degree 
of norm acceptance as triggers that increase the likelihood of dissent.
Our central arguments regarding the joint evolution of PoC and R2P are 
twofold. First, while there is strong evidence of institutionalization and implemen-
tation of particular aspects of both norms, discursive and behavioural contestation 
of pillar three of R2P—which concerns the responsibility of the international 
community to take appropriate collective action where a state is manifestly failing 
to protect its own population—and of the use of force for protection in peace-
keeping have increased significantly over time and are closely linked. Second, the 
evolution of R2P and PoC has broadly unfolded in a diamond-shaped fashion: 
having emerged from a similar individualist normative starting-point, they then 
diverged in their early development as their proponents interacted with relevant 
audiences and identified the practical implications of their respective normative 
imperatives; more recently, they have begun to reconverge in their return to a state-
centric focus on building and strengthening the capacity of national authorities to 
protect populations. This prioritization of the state is a result partly of efforts by 
norm advocates to shore up support for PoC and R2P, but also—particularly in 
the case of R2P—of the ability of key states, through discursive contestation, to 
shape the meaning of these norms in ways that speak to their normative priorities. 
Our analysis contributes to the broader theoretical literature on norms and norm 
contestation in a number of ways. First, we move beyond earlier constructivist 
studies that examine a single norm and thus underplay the existence of broader 
‘norm complexes’ that encompass related principles with shared ethical or political 
foundations.4 Where scholars have focused on more than one norm, the relation-
ship between ideational units has been framed in one of two ways: either as a rela-
tionship of competition, in which one norm, often an emerging norm, vies with 
another existing norm; or as an adaptive process of norm localization, in which 
international norms are reinterpreted and reconstituted through their interaction 
or ‘fit’ with pre-existing local normative orders.5 By contrast, we demonstrate 
that PoC and R2P have evolved and continue to evolve together, underscoring 
the importance of ideational interplay and the way in which actors may seek to 
strengthen support for one norm, or dimension of a norm, by contrasting it or 
linking it with another. Second, our discussion of PoC and R2P draws attention to 
the importance of ‘venues’ for norm dynamics and how choice of venue and insti-
tutional processes is used strategically to frame normative discourse.6 Finally, with 
norm’. See Anette Stimmer and Lea Wisken, ‘The dynamics of dissent: when actions are louder than words’, 
International Affairs 95: 3, May 2019, doi: 10.1093/ia/iiz019.
3 Stimmer and Wisken define implementation access as the ‘positional, material and social assets required for 
putting a norm into practice’. These resources ‘endow actors with greater leverage for affecting norm imple-
mentation and hence also greater abilities and incentives to use behavioural contestation’: ‘The dynamics of 
dissent’.
4 Notable exceptions include Welsh, ‘Norm contestation’; Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping; and Carla 
Winston, ‘Norm structure, diffusion, and evolution: a conceptual approach’, European Journal of International 
Relations 24: 3, 2018, pp. 638–61. 
5 See e.g. Amitav Acharya, ‘How ideas spread: whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change 
in Asian regionalism’, International Organization 58: 2, 2004, pp. 239–75.
6 Katharina Coleman, ‘Locating norm diplomacy: venue change in international norm negotiations’, European 






/ia/article-abstract/95/3/597/5460076 by European U
niversity Institute user on 08 M
ay 2019
Close cousins in protection: the evolution of two norms
599
International Affairs 95: 3, 2019
respect to the norm contestation framework proposed by Stimmer and Wisken, 
we argue that application or invocation of one norm instead of another may itself 
figure as behavioural contestation. By extending their framework, we also identify 
the absence of clearly assigned responsibility for acting on the prescriptions of 
the two norms, and the ambiguity over the nature of obligation inherent in both 
of them, as factors that perpetuate both discursive and behavioural contestation, 
including the choice to invoke one norm rather than the other. 
The article proceeds in three sections. First, we briefly compare and contrast 
PoC and R2P according to their origins, scope and structure. We identify three 
features common to both norms that render them particularly susceptible to 
contestation. The second section traces the evolution of the two norms and their 
dynamic interplay across three phases that roughly correspond to norm emergence 
and institutionalization (1999–2005), conceptual refinement and early implemen-
tation (2006–10) and the ‘mature’ implementation (2011–18) that followed particu-
larly contentious cases, such as those of Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. For each phase, 
we identify forms of discursive and behavioural contestation, at the macro level 
in policy and mandate creation at UN headquarters, and at the micro level in 
specific operational contexts. The final interpretative section engages more closely 
with the insights developed in Stimmer and Wisken’s framework regarding the 
nature and impact of behavioural contestation, and the ways in which the inherent 
features of R2P and PoC create opportunities for states to dissent. 
Similar but different norms
The emergence of R2P and PoC at the turn of the new millennium was a direct 
response to the failures to protect civilians in the ‘safe areas’ of the former 
Yugoslavia and from genocide in Rwanda, and the perceived need to clarify the 
broader protection obligations of UN forces and member states.7 It was thus 
propelled by the normative impulse to prioritize the security not just of sover-
eign states but of individuals, both in countries’ foreign policies and in the work 
of international organizations. A central figure in the promotion of this process 
of ‘individualization’ was the new UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who was 
significantly affected by previous experience in the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) during the painful episodes of the 1990s.8 
Explicit authorization to protect civilians under Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter was first mandated by the Security Council in 1999, when Resolution 1270 
authorized the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) ‘to afford protection to 
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’.9 The genesis of UNAMSIL’s 
Journal of International Relations 19: 1, 2013, pp. 163–86.
7 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo also influenced advocates of R2P. See Kofi Annan and Nader Mousavizadeh, 
Interventions: a life in war and peace (New York: Penguin, 2012).
8 Annan and Mousavizadeh, Interventions. See also Gabriella Blum, ‘The individualization of war’, in Austin 
Sarat, Lawrence Douglas and Martha Umphrey, eds, Law and war (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2014); Jennifer Welsh, ‘Humanitarian actors and international political theory’, in Chris Brown and Robyn 
Eckersley, eds, The Oxford handbook of international political theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
9 S/RES/1270, 22 Oct. 1999. 
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landmark mandate, and the broader thematic work of the Security Council on 
PoC, can be traced back to Annan’s 1998 report to the Council on conflict in Africa, 
which identified PoC in conflict as a ‘humanitarian imperative’ and called upon the 
Council to address both the deep causes and immediate implications of intrastate 
wars.10 In February 1999 the Security Council, under the Canadian presidency, 
hosted its first open debate dedicated to PoC, followed by the release of a Council 
presidential statement and the Secretary-General’s first report on ‘the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict’.11 These foundational documents articulated a broad and 
multidimensional PoC agenda that the Security Council continues to pursue today. 
As Annan’s 2001 report on PoC indicates, protection of civilians was conceived 
of as a ‘multi-layered process involving a diversity of entities and approaches’ 
and encompassing a range of activities from ‘the delivery of humanitarian assis-
tance; the monitoring and recording of violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law ...  [to] institution building, governance, and development 
programmes; and, ultimately, the deployment of peacekeepers’.12
While PoC’s birth and early development took place within the UN, R2P was 
initially conceived and advocated ‘from without’—though with Annan’s strong 
encouragement. The independent International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS), created by the Canadian government, provided the 
intellectual underpinnings for the Responsibility to Protect, through its efforts 
to reshape the meaning of sovereignty and to identify a spectrum of actions to 
address the challenge of atrocity crimes, that ranged from prevention to response 
to post-conflict rebuilding.13 The concept of R2P subsequently entered the UN 
system as part of the preparatory documents for the 2005 world summit.14 After 
intense negotiations during which opposition to R2P was voiced from various 
quarters,15 member states included the principle in article 138 of the summit 
outcome document, which affirmed the primary responsibility of states to protect 
their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. Article 139 outlined a collective responsibility on the part 
of states to assist each other in fulfilling this responsibility, and declared their 
preparedness to take timely and decisive action, through the Security Council and 
in accordance with the UN Charter, when national authorities ‘manifestly fail’ to 
protect their populations.16 
10 The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-
General, S/1998/318 (New York: UN, 13 April 1998). 
11 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1999/6 (New York: UN, 12 Feb. 1999); Report of the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/1999/957 (New York: 
UN, 8 Sept. 1999).
12 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/2001/331 (New 
York: UN, 30 March 2001), para. 6.
13 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: Inter-
national Development Research Centre, 2001).
14 See A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, A/59/565 (New York: UN, 1 Dec. 2004); In larger freedom: towards development, security 
and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005 (New York: UN, 21 March 2005).
15 See Alex J. Bellamy, Global politics and the Responsibility to Protect: from words to deeds (London: Routledge, 2011).
16 World summit outcome document, A/Res/60/1 (New York: UN 16 Sept. 2005), paras 138, 139.
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Vulnerability to contestation
As Winston observes, the fact that norms—by their very nature—are both stable 
and flexible often makes it difficult to reach agreement on their content and to 
identify the particular behaviours that their underlying values demand.17 This 
difficulty is particularly acute for R2P and PoC, which, as relatively recent and 
‘emerging norms’, have experienced significant discursive and behavioural contes-
tation. Three features, intrinsic to both norms, have made them particularly 
vulnerable to contestation. 
The first concerns issues of legality and the status of both norms. Whereas 
many of the norms studied in International Relations have been enshrined in legal 
form, PoC and R2P have a different relationship to international law. Both norms 
have elements that comprise and build upon existing international law, along with 
elements that some would argue go beyond the law’s stipulations. This gives rise 
to contestation over their scope and the nature of the obligations associated with 
them, including the degree to which they are considered ‘binding’. 
In the case of PoC, the Security Council’s framing of the norm in peace-
keeping has invoked a general, non-legalized concept of physical security aimed at 
addressing a wide range of threats to civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings. 
The absence of reference to international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law in most PoC mandates broadens the norm’s scope to encom-
pass incidents of physical violence that may not contravene international law.18 
The lack of legally defined triggers for action also gives peacekeepers significant 
discretion in interpreting what constitutes a threat.19 Furthermore, scholars and 
practitioners remain divided over the question of whether protection mandates 
entail an affirmative legal obligation on peacekeepers to act when civilians are 
threatened or actually being attacked in their areas of deployment.20 Thus, while 
it is generally accepted that Chapter VII mandates provide peacekeepers with legal 
authorization to use force to protect civilians, in practice such mandates seem to 
provide more of a discretionary right, allowing peacekeepers themselves to use 
their judgement in deciding whether and how the use of force is appropriate. 
In contrast to PoC, R2P was deliberately institutionalized at the 2005 world 
summit as a political rather than a legal principle. As a result, the General Assembly 
resolution endorsing R2P can be seen—at most—as an authoritative interpreta-
tion of established legal regimes related to both the prevention and the punish-
ment of international crimes and the use of force.21 Proponents of R2P did not 
17 Winston, ‘Norm structure, diffusion, and evolution’, p. 639. As she notes, while norms entail that a state is 
constrained to ‘do something appropriate’, the flexibility inherent in norms means that states can often deter-
mine for themselves what appropriate behaviour means in any context (p. 647).
18 Ralph Mamiya, ‘A history and conceptual development of the Protection of Civilians’, in Haidi Willmot, 
Ralph Mamiya, Marc Weller and Scott Sheeran, eds, Protection of Civilians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), p. 79.
19 Mamiya, ‘A history and conceptual development’, p. 79. 
20 Mona Ali Khalil, ‘Legal aspects of the use of force by United Nations peacekeepers for the Protection of 
Civilians’, in Willmot et al., eds, Protection of Civilians, pp. 205–23.  
21 See Carsten Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: political rhetoric or emerging legal norm’, American Journal of 
International Law 101: 1, 2007, pp. 99–120; Maria Banda and Jennifer Welsh, ‘International law and the Respon-
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seek to create new law, but rather to enhance compliance with states’ existing 
legal commitments. The new principle would do this, they hoped, by legitimizing 
a shift in expectations about how the international community should view a 
specific set of extreme situations in which any of four crimes are imminent or have 
been committed. That R2P has a narrower scope of concern and greater precision 
than PoC has not, however, eliminated the possibility of contestation. Instead, the 
debate has shifted to the epistemic problems associated with arriving at a collective 
view on a situation involving an atrocity crime and on whether the international 
community’s responsibility has been triggered, as well as the difficulty of deter-
mining if and when military force should be considered.22
Second, a lack of specificity as to what is required for their implementa-
tion renders both norms particularly vulnerable to contestation. With PoC this 
ambiguity results primarily from the fact that Security Council mandates are 
outlined only briefly in resolutions, which provide general direction but little 
operational guidance. PoC is framed directively as a norm requiring action from 
peacekeepers when civilians are threatened. Nevertheless, how peacekeepers are 
meant to intervene—what types of actions are required, including the extent to 
which force can and should be used proactively or pre-emptively—has been under-
specified, as have details on the procurement of resources necessary for protection. 
Beginning in 2010, the DPKO developed conceptual and operational guidance on 
PoC, moving beyond the ‘domain of physical protection from imminent threat’ 
and outlining three tiers of protection: (1) protection through political processes 
(e.g. mediation, good offices); (2) protection from physical violence (e.g. through 
deterrence or forceful response); and (3) establishment of a protective environ-
ment (e.g. through capacity-building and the rule of law).23 However, rather 
than making the norm more precise and providing more guidance for action, as 
discussed below, this three-tiered framework has arguably increased its ambiguity 
as well as the possibilities for confusion and conflicting interpretations. 
Like PoC, R2P is a directive norm that articulates a desired state of affairs—
protection for individuals threatened with atrocity crimes—but does not set out a 
particular set of behaviours for states or other international actors. This ambigu-
ity is compounded by two factors. The first is the norm’s three-pillar framework, 
developed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his first report to the General 
Assembly in order to give greater guidance on how R2P could be operationalized.24 
The ‘complex norm’ of R2P thus not only contains more than one prescription—
for states and for the international community—but also creates a situation in 
which the breach of one of the components of R2P (failure by a national govern-
ment to protect its population) is meant to act as a trigger for fulfilment of another 
component (the international community’s remedial role in protecting). This 
sibility to Protect: clarifying or expanding states’ responsibilities?’, Global Responsibility to Protect 2: 3, 2010, 
pp. 213–31.
22 See Jennifer Welsh, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’, Daedulus 145: 4, 2016, pp. 75–87.
23 Draft Operational Concept for the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support Policy, 2010), p. 4.
24 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677 (New York: UN, 12 Jan. 
2009).
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formulation makes the norm susceptible to what scholars have called ‘applicatory 
contestation’,25 given that states can debate whether greater emphasis should be 
placed on one pillar rather than another, and when the international community’s 
remedial role has been activated. The second factor contributing to ambiguity is 
the tendency for actors to invoke the morally charged concept of responsibility 
primarily as a means to summon up political will, rather than to establish a concrete 
plan of action. Pillar three does not prescribe a specific collective action to be taken 
by the international community, but rather establishes a more general ‘duty of 
conduct’ on the part of its members to identify when atrocity crimes are being 
committed or are imminent,26 and to deliberate—on a ‘case-by-case’ basis—on 
how various actors (national, regional and international) can and should respond. 
The third element of both norms that has increased their vulnerability to 
contestation is their ambiguous relationship to other, more mature norms. As a 
relatively recent priority for peacekeepers, PoC interacts in controversial ways 
with established principles of peacekeeping: impartiality, host-state consent, and 
non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The insti-
tutionalization of PoC has resulted in a reinterpretation of this trinity.27 Impar-
tiality, no longer construed as passive, now prescribes that ‘UN forces should 
implement their mandates without favour or prejudice to any party’,28 while 
consent is divided into two levels: strategic and tactical.29 While the former is still 
a requirement for any peacekeeping mission, the latter is no longer deemed neces-
sary: forceful action should be taken against those who imperil civilians. 
Notwithstanding this refinement by the Secretariat, tensions remain. There is 
confusion over what actions are permissible to implement the protection impera-
tive and whether force can be used against one party without the mission being 
regarded as partial. Additionally, although missions authorized under Chapter 
VII have procedures for enforcement action and are legally allowed to use force 
without host-state consent, the belief is still widespread among member states and 
within the Secretariat that consent remains a political if not a legal requirement.30 
This tension has arisen in contexts such as Darfur, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, where government forces have been major 
perpetrators of violence against civilians.
As a political norm, R2P has been positioned as a reinforcer of established 
legal obligations related to atrocity crimes. Some scholars have therefore begun to 
refer to a broader ‘normative complex’ for protection that encompasses genocide 
25 ‘Applicatory contestation’ refers to contestation over ‘(1) [whether a norm is] appropriate for a given situation 
and (2) which actions it requires’: Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, Things we lost in the fire: how 
different types of contestation affect the validity of international norms, PRIF working papers no. 18 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2013), p. 5.
26 Welsh, ‘Norm contestation’.
27 Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping.
28 United Nations peacekeeping operations: principles and guidelines (New York: DPKO, 2008), p. 33.
29 United Nations peacekeeping operations: principles and guidelines, pp. 19, 67; The protection of civilians in United Nations 
peacekeeping (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support Policy, 
1 April 2015), p. 7.
30 See e.g. Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016 substantive session, A/70/19 (New York: 
UN, 15 March 2016), p. 11.
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prevention, particular principles of international humanitarian law, accountability 
for international crimes, and PoC in armed conflict.31 Yet R2P’s origins lie in a 
perceived tension between two sets of norms: those related to the promotion and 
protection of human rights, and those related to non-intervention and the non-use 
of force. By rooting R2P’s coercive aspects firmly within the collective security 
provisions of the UN Charter, and effectively ruling out the legitimacy of unilat-
eral humanitarian intervention, the 2005 summit outcome document arguably 
resolved that tension: any use of force to implement R2P is to be authorized by 
the Security Council and thus should not be deemed unlawful interference in 
a state’s domestic jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the annual dialogues in the General 
Assembly reveal a belief on the part of some states that R2P creates a more permis-
sive approach to intervention by legitimizing a wider range of protective action.32
Contestation of R2P and PoC has been shaped not only by these intrinsic features 
of both norms, but also by two additional factors: the institutional ‘homes’—or 
venues—in which the norms have been embedded, as well as the degree to which 
actors have implementation access.33 PoC was owned first and foremost by the 
Security Council—the body that issues protection mandates. Implementation 
access was therefore limited to permanent and non-permanent members of the 
Council as well as, to a lesser extent, countries contributing troops to peacekeep-
ing missions. As shown below, PoC also gradually came to be discussed within the 
C34—the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations that was established by 
and reports to the General Assembly. In this venue, a broader range of states has, 
on the basis of deliberation and consensus, fleshed out how peacekeeping opera-
tions actually function. But the creation of twin homes for PoC—the Security 
Council and C34—has opened up a gap between the venue where the norm is 
formally authorized and that where its implementation is most actively discussed 
and planned, thereby increasing the likelihood of behavioural contestation and 
underscoring the importance of venue and access in accounting for norm dynamics. 
R2P took the opposite path. It was initially owned by the General Assembly, 
offering equal and ‘open access’—at least theoretically—for all member states. 
Key countries such as Russia and China consciously precluded discussion of the 
principle within the Security Council chamber and sceptical developing countries 
guarded their role in furthering ‘conceptual development’ within the Assembly.34 
The General Assembly has continued to be the paramount venue for discussion 
of R2P, through the annual informal dialogues and, as of 2018, through formal 
agenda debate. With increased frequency since 2011, however, the Security Council 
has passed a series of resolutions referring to R2P—both in specific cases and in 
relation to thematic issues.35 This has opened up the possibility for preferential 
implementation access to those countries sitting within the Council chamber. On 
31 Rotmann et al., ‘Major powers and the contested evolution of a Responsibility to Protect’.
32 See summaries of the General Assembly interactive dialogues, 2013–17, and the formal debate of the Assembly 
on 25 June 2018, http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/897. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all 
URLs cited in this article were accessible on 12 March 2019.)
33 On ‘implementation access’, see n. 3 above.
34 Welsh, ‘Norm contestation’. 
35 See Global Centre for R2P, http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/335.
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the other hand, the implementation framework set out in 2009 consciously seeks 
to move R2P beyond ‘New York’, not only to other intergovernmental bodies 
such as the human rights mechanisms in Geneva, but also to regional organiza-
tions, individual member states and civil society. This move theoretically provides 
implementation access to a host of actors, though—according to two leading 
observers of R2P—‘to date, embrace of the norm outside of the UN has still 
been relatively “shallow”’.36
In relation to PoC and R2P alike, the UN Secretariat has remained a critical 
actor in trying to bridge both the gap between authorization and actual practice, 
and the differing views among member states about the two norms’ prescriptions. 
As a result, largely in response to discursive contestation, Secretariat officials have 
actively sought to find a consensus on how PoC and R2P should be conceived and 
operationalized. 
Mapping contestation
This section analyses discursive and behavioural contestation of R2P and PoC in 
three phases, beginning with the late 1990s and concluding with recent events in 
Burundi, Syria and Myanmar (Burma). We draw on a variety of primary sources, 
including reports of the UN Secretary-General on R2P and the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict, Security Council resolutions and statements that make 
reference to R2P and PoC, summaries of the annual informal interactive dialogue 
on R2P in the General Assembly and the annual C34 meeting on peacekeeping, as 
well as individual member state statements and policy actions. In order to supple-
ment these formal documents, and gain insight into the perspective of institu-
tional actors on the interplay between the two norms, we also draw on targeted 
semi-structured interviews.
The mapping of contestation undertaken here demonstrates that while PoC 
and R2P developed in different venues and with distinct policy frameworks, they 
have evolved in parallel. Indeed, in response to contestation, actors have at times 
explicitly sought to contrast or link the two norms. This section also shows, in 
line with Stimmer and Wisken’s framework, that norm ambiguity, differentiated 
implementation access and lack of institutional responsibility can increase the 
likelihood of behavioural contestation. 
Phase I (1999–2005)
PoC experienced little overt discursive contestation in its early years, having not 
yet appeared on the agenda of the C34 and thus lacking substantive discussion 
by a range of states. The Security Council’s pursuit of PoC as a broad thematic 
issue focused on three initiatives during this period: a ‘roadmap’ outlining the 
protection responsibilities of various UN bodies; better coordination between the 
36 Alex J. Bellamy and Edward C. Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: from promise to practice (Cambridge: Polity, 
2018), p. 189.
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Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and DPKO; and 
drafting the first aide-memoire on protection.37 Moreover, while peacekeepers in 
the DRC, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire were authorized with protection mandates, 
the actual practice of PoC during these years was erratic. Evidence of behav-
ioural contestation was therefore also slim, and tended to become manifest more 
indirectly through lack of resources to support robust protection.
Somewhat surprisingly, it was within the Office of the Secretary-General and 
the DPKO, and among certain states, that PoC was hotly contested. While states 
advocating PoC in the Security Council were keen to push implementation of the 
norm forward with robust peacekeeping mandates, Kofi Annan was concerned 
about the UN getting ahead of its broader membership, and thus failing to garner 
the necessary backing to deliver ‘real’ protection. ‘Stern words’ were reportedly 
exchanged between Annan and Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler during the 
drafting of Resolution 1270 on Sierra Leone.38 The message from the Secretary-
General’s office was, as Fowler put it: ‘Don’t design to fail. Just because you have a 
nice idea, just because it is informed by goodness doesn’t mean it will work. If you 
set up a mandate like this and we fail, it will be catastrophic for the institution.’39 
In other words, Annan’s concern that the UN might overpromise and under-
deliver, and thus damage its legitimacy, put brakes on his normative ambition. 
His ‘principled activism’ was balanced by ‘the hard-learnt recognition that the 
Council’s stated ambitions do not always translate into tangible commitments in 
practice’.40 
A related worry among Annan and Secretariat officials was that PoC would be 
used as token evidence that the Security Council was ‘doing something’ about a 
crisis.41 It would effectively become ‘R2P-lite’, thereby weakening Annan’s other 
normative agenda. The crafting of robust PoC mandates would serve as a substi-
tute for—a form of behavioural contestation of—not only the Security Council’s 
political engagement, but also more forceful military action. By the mid-2000s, 
the belief that robust peacekeeping mandates were diverting attention from the 
requirements of R2P became more widespread in the Secretariat. The reigning 
assumption was that because peacekeeping still requires, at least in theory, a degree 
of state consent, it limits the possible coercive use of force and thus avoids R2P’s 
frequent association with humanitarian intervention. 
In these early years, it was precisely the continued controversy over humani-
tarian intervention that dominated the debate over R2P, which took place in a 
variety of settings outside the intergovernmental frameworks of the UN. Despite 
the ICISS report’s seemingly elegant solution to the twin problems of Rwanda and 
Kosovo, it quickly became clear that the concept of a ‘responsibility to protect’ 
could not avoid normative and legal controversy, or neo-colonial connotations.42 
37 UN Security Council, Protection of Civilians, cross-cutting report no. 2 (New York, 2008).
38 Quoted in Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping, p. 106.
39 Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping, p. 106.
40 Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping, p. 95.
41 The causes of conflict, p. 77. 
42 Jennifer Welsh, ‘The “Responsibility to Protect”: securing the individual in international society?’, in Benja-
min Goold and Liora Lazarus, eds, Security and human rights (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
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The subsequent war in Iraq was a huge setback for efforts to build normative 
consensus in favour of R2P and to pursue formal codification, given the fears 
it seemed to confirm about states bypassing the UN system in using force and 
twisting humanitarian arguments to buttress more narrow national interests.43
Unexpectedly, it was the fallout from Iraq that enabled R2P to re-emerge on 
the diplomatic agenda.44 The key moment came when the principle was picked up 
by the high-level panel of experts chosen by Annan in September 2003 to address 
the growing tensions in the UN’s collective security system.45 Thus, somewhat 
paradoxically, while the Secretary-General seemed to be putting the brakes on 
PoC within the Secretariat, he was simultaneously lobbying extensively for R2P 
to be brought into the UN system. The high-level panel challenged the view that 
there were no longer any rules governing military intervention, and endorsed the 
claims of ICISS that ‘proper purpose’ in respect of the use of force now encom-
passed actions designed to save civilians from atrocity crimes. Both positions were 
echoed by Annan in his March 2005 report to the General Assembly, which laid 
the groundwork for the intergovernmental negotiations that led to the summit 
outcome document.46
At this point, all member states had the opportunity to discursively contest both 
the appropriateness and the meaning of R2P. In practice, as with many multilateral 
negotiations, coalitions of states staked out positions around contentious issues, and 
those with greater expertise and influence exercised disproportionate impact on the 
final outcome. For example, the effort to establish Security Council criteria for the 
use of force was contested by the permanent members of the Council, in particular 
the United States, which were worried that a checklist ‘set in stone’ would diminish 
the flexibility they had hitherto enjoyed to interpret and respond to the interna-
tional security landscape.47 Many developing countries (most vocally represented 
by China, India and Iran) expressed unease about the potential expansion of the 
legitimate exceptions to article 2(4) of the UN Charter and thus the possibility of 
further military action by the strong against the weak. They also called for the 
international community to focus greater attention on building capacity in weak 
states before the development of intervention-generating crises.
As a result of this contestation, the language articulating the responsibilities of 
the international community in the summit outcome document was weaker than 
that which appeared in the ICISS report. An odd coalition of states—including 
the United States and many developing countries in the General Assembly—
called for this less expansive language. Nonetheless, in opposition to the discursive 
contestation of states such as Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Syria, article 139 of the 
summit outcome document explicitly mentions Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
For those states advocating R2P, most notably Canada and EU member states, 
43 Gareth Evans, ‘When is it right to fight?’, Survival 46: 3, 2004, pp. 59–81; David Clark, ‘Iraq has wrecked our 
case for humanitarian wars’, Guardian, 21 Aug. 2003. 
44 This point is emphasized by Marc Pollentine. See the discussion in Welsh, ‘Norm contestation’.
45 See A more secure world.
46 In larger freedom.
47 Letter from Ambassador John Bolton to UN, 30 Aug. 2005, available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.
org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05[1].pdf.
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the principle would have lacked teeth without this link to enforcement by the 
Security Council.48
A final noteworthy feature of the summit outcome document, which laid 
the groundwork for later episodes of behavioural contestation, is the fact that 
the international community’s responsibility to protect, set out in article 139, 
is preceded by article 138’s emphasis on the ‘primary responsibility’ of national 
authorities. While this formulation reflected the normative consensus, it also gave 
states the opportunity to argue about proper sequencing and, ultimately, to block 
or sabotage international action to protect. Those states that in 2004 opposed the 
application of sanctions against the Sudanese government in relation to its conduct 
in Darfur reiterated that it is sovereign states who remain the ‘first responders’ in 
terms of protection, and that the crisis had not reached the point where it could 
be definitively concluded that Sudan had failed to live up to its responsibilities.49 
Phase II (2006–2010)
At this point R2P and PoC figured in different institutional forums within the 
UN, with the General Assembly taking the lead on the former. The Security 
Council was comparatively silent on R2P, becoming bogged down in lengthy 
negotiations over two resolutions in 2006,50 and passing only one resolution on 
the subject between 2007 and 2010.51 This reticence on R2P contrasted with the 
Council’s more active and sharper engagement with PoC in this phase, prompted 
in part by negative news coverage of crises in the DRC, Somalia and Sudan.52 
Resolution 1674 (2006) introduced new language aimed at ensuring implemen-
tation of PoC mandates by peacekeeping missions.53 In 2008, under Resolution 
1856, the UN mission in the DRC became the first to operate with a mandate that 
designated PoC as the highest priority, and to consider physical threats of violence 
to civilians ‘from any of the parties engaged in the conflict’.54 The following year, 
in a thematic resolution on PoC (Resolution 1894), the Council stressed that for 
all peacekeeping missions, mandated protection activities had to ‘be given priority 
in resource allocation’.55
To bridge these disparate normative discourses and build support for R2P, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, unlike his predecessor, actively promoted the 
linkages between the two norms—a move that caused considerable discomfort 
within parts of the Secretariat. In his first Report on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict (2007), the Secretary-General suggested that R2P as manifest in the summit 
48 Welsh, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’.
49 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the crisis in Darfur’, Security Dialogue 
36: 1, 2005, pp. 27–47. 
50 Resolution 1706, discussed below, and Resolution 1674 (2006) reaffirmed articles 138 and 139 of the summit 
outcome document. 
51 S/RES/1894, 11 Nov. 2009. 
52 See UN Security Council, Protection of Civilians. 
53 S/RES/1674, 28 April 2006. 
54 S/RES/1856, 22 Dec. 2008, emphasis added. 
55 S/RES/ 1894, 11 Nov. 2009. 
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outcome document had advanced the normative framework of PoC.56 Two years 
later, he articulated an explicit connection between R2P and PoC, and called for 
the ‘mainstreaming’ of R2P through UN peacekeeping operations.57 
In an instance of discursive contestation, the DPKO responded with a ‘delib-
erate effort’ to disentangle the two norms and differentiate PoC from R2P.58 PoC 
was to maintain its place of prominence in UN peacekeeping, whereas R2P was 
expunged from official peacekeeping discourse because of the perceived political 
sensitivities surrounding it. The DPKO’s position reflected broader concerns, 
voiced by some states, that contestation over R2P—and specifically the norm’s link 
to coercive military means—risked contaminating PoC. While many countries 
praised the emerging R2P norm, a vocal group of states, notably Cuba, Egypt 
and Pakistan, expressed unease about the implications of the summit outcome 
document in the first General Assembly debate on the subject and in subsequent 
informal interactive dialogues.59 Resistance to the norm was also expressed by 
sceptical states through forms of behavioural contestation, including opposi-
tion to funding for the Office of Special Adviser during the bi-annual budget 
debate of the Fifth Committee of the Assembly. Representatives from China, 
Cuba and Pakistan insisted that the office’s budget should be determined by the 
entire General Assembly—a procedural intervention that stalled funding for three 
years.60
The ongoing crisis in Darfur constituted another early site for behavioural 
contestation over R2P. Although Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006) and 
subsequent action represented a victory of sorts for advocates such as France 
and the United Kingdom, which were trying to build momentum around the 
emerging norm, the fact that the Council took more than six months to negotiate 
its response illustrates the degree of unease felt by some member states.61 The 
final text of the resolution, which authorized the transition from a regional to a 
UN mission, raised difficult issues regarding the importance of host-state consent. 
China and Russia, along with Qatar, ultimately abstained from voting on Resolu-
tion 1706, and China (along with Sudan) actively prevented the invocation of R2P 
in a subsequent resolution on Darfur (Resolution 1769) just a year later.62 Given 
that repetition of language in UN resolutions can be interpreted as reaffirmation 
56 Report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2007/643 (New York: UN, 2007); Thomas G. Weiss and Tati-
ana Carayannis, ‘Windows of opportunity for UN reform: historical insights for the next Secretary-General’, 
International Affairs 93: 2, March 2017, pp. 309–28.
57 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677 (New York: UN, 12 Jan. 
2009), para. 68.
58 Author’s telephone interview with UN official, July 2018. 
59 See remarks by member states in the first informal dialogue on the R2P in July 2009, available at http://www.
globalr2p.org/resources/897. 
60 Fifth Committee takes up financing for special political missions, procurement, GA/AB/3832 (New York: UN, 17 Dec. 
2007). See also Stimmer and Wisken, ‘The dynamics of dissent’.
61 We consider that Security Council resolutions represent one of the strongest forms of action by the Council—
given that it is an authorizing rather than an operational body—and thus can be considered as evidence for/
against behavioural contestation. When states negotiate for a particular framing of a situation, or for specific 
language in a mandate, they are directly shaping what operational actors can and cannot do in practice.
62 See the discussion in Jess Gifkins, ‘R2P in the UN Security Council: Darfur, Libya and beyond’, Cooperation 
and Conflict 51: 2, 2016, pp. 156–7. 
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of principles and practices, the active blocking of R2P language by some Council 
members can be understood as a form of behavioural contestation. 
In addition to forms of discursive and behavioural contestation over R2P, 
growing dissent over PoC exacerbated the DPKO’s concerns about conflating the 
two norms. During consultations in 2005–2007 to develop the first ever compre-
hensive peacekeeping doctrine, many states associated with the Non-Aligned 
Movement voiced objections to the Council’s emphasis on the use of force to 
protect civilians from physical threat.63 Consequently, when PoC first featured 
on the C34’s agenda in 2008, it was criticized by a number of states—including 
several of the largest troop-contributing countries (TCCs)—which claimed that 
PoC mandates were eroding the norms of sovereignty and self-determination.64 
Many of these same states pointed to inherent inequalities in decision-making 
and peacekeeping policy, namely inadequate consultation with TCCs and lack of 
burden-sharing.65
Implementation of PoC was also compromised by behavioural contestation 
at the field level. In places like Kiwanja (DRC), peacekeepers with knowledge 
of imminent threats to civilians failed to take preventive action.66 The reasons 
for this inaction included insufficient capabilities, the perceived risks associated 
with acting, and confusion over conflicting interpretations of mandates. A 2009 
OCHA–DPKO study highlighted the dearth of operational guidance on PoC and 
concluded that UN staff continued to hold widely varying interpretations of the 
mandate, often within the same mission context.67
These various forms of discursive and behavioural contestation were instru-
mental in motivating efforts to clarify the meaning and scope of both norms. Ban 
Ki-moon’s three-pillar conceptualization of R2P became the accepted consensus 
on the norm’s meaning in diplomatic circles.68 Furthermore, controversial attempts 
by states to misapply R2P to the cases of Iraq, Cyclone Nargis and South Ossetia, 
combined with its successful application in the wake of electoral violence in Kenya 
in 2007–2008, helped to define the norm’s scope.69 The ‘narrow but deep approach’ 
to R2P implementation,70 advocated by the Secretary-General and his first Special 
Adviser, clarified both the limited range of situations to which the norm would 
apply and the broad suite of tools that implementation would require. 
Similarly, in response to contestation over PoC, DPKO officials developed the 
three-tiered conceptualization of the norm that expanded its scope to encompass 
63 United Nations peacekeeping operations: principles and guidelines.
64 Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides in peacekeeping. 
65 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, p.17; Uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and 
people, Report of the UN High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (New York: UN, June 2015).
66 Human Rights Watch, Killings in Kiwanja: the UN’s inability to protect civilians (New York, 2008).
67 OCHA and DPKO, Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations (New York, 2009).
68 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. 
69 Cristina G. Badescu and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and advancing norms: an alternative spiral?’, 
International Studies Perspectives, vol. 11, 2010, pp. 354–74.
70 Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The “narrow but deep approach” to implementing the Responsibility to Protect: reassess-
ing the focus on international crimes’, in Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis and Alex Zucker, eds, Reconstructing 
atrocity prevention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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prescriptions that do not require use of force and emphasize support to the state.71 
This was partly an attempt to make PoC more palatable to its critics, as one DPKO 
official observed: ‘That was part of the messaging, definitely part of our theory of 
change ...  It was in large part about assuring sceptical Member States that peace-
keeping is mostly not about the use of force.’72 The Security Council’s authoriza-
tion of increasingly robust mandates in the next phase, however, seemed to suggest 
otherwise. 
Phase III (2011–2018) 
The spring of 2011 was a turning point for both norms. In March, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1973, which authorized member states ‘to take all neces-
sary measures ...  to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi’. The resolution was 
unprecedented in its authorization to protect civilians without the consent of the 
host state. And yet, while the military action in Libya is described as a ‘textbook 
case’ of R2P implementation,73 and the norm is widely viewed as having been 
an important motivating factor for some western actors in the intervention,74 
the phrase ‘responsibility to protect’ did not appear in the mandate. Instead, PoC 
language was used in what was essentially an R2P intervention. The following 
month a diplomatic furore erupted over the actions of UN peacekeepers in 
the aftermath of a contested presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire. UN-autho-
rized forces used helicopter gunships against the presidential palace of Laurent 
Gbagbo—in the name of protecting civilians—while Alassane Ouattara, Gbagbo’s 
opponent, was protected by peacekeepers at his base. 
The fallout was immense. In both cases, critics charged that PoC had morphed 
into regime change and that humanitarian arguments were being abused to further 
western interests. In an instance of discursive contestation, the Brazilian govern-
ment launched ‘Responsibility while Protecting’—an initiative aimed at reinter-
preting R2P by emphasizing the international community’s non-military options, 
limiting recourse to force as a ‘last resort’, and strengthening the accountability of 
those who act militarily under a Council mandate. These themes, which garnered 
a significant degree of support among member states, became sticking points in 
the (unsuccessful) efforts to pass a new General Assembly resolution on R2P in 
2015—ten years after the summit outcome document.75 The discursive contesta-
tion that surrounded negotiations over the draft text illustrates the formation of 
a new kind of political coalition that included pro-R2P states that perceived an 
71 Draft Operational Concept for the Protection of Civilians.
72 Author’s telephone interview with UN official, July 2018. 
73 Interview with Gareth Evans by Alan Philps for The World Today 68: 6, Oct./Nov. 2012, pp. 30–32, http://
www.globalr2p.org/media/files/gareth-evans-on-responsibility-to-protect-after-libya.pdf.
74 Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Power in practice: negotiating the international intervention in 
Libya’, European Journal of International Relations 20: 4, 2014, pp. 889–911.
75 Aarie Glas, ‘African Union security culture in practice: African problems and African solutions’, International 
Affairs 94: 5, Sept. 2018, pp. 1121–38.
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illegitimate stretching of the NATO mandate in Libya and developing countries 
that had always worried about the prospect of regime change imposed from the 
outside.76 This coalition was opposed by France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, all of which were and remain resistant to any mechanisms that 
would curtail the Security Council’s freedom of manoeuvre or submit its actions 
to forms of oversight.77 
The backlash from the events of 2011 is also evident in the emphasis that some 
states place on the state-centric elements of R2P and PoC, in contrast to the more 
individualist or ‘people-centred’ vision of the ICISS report. A set of developing 
countries, including China, has drawn on the specific text of the summit outcome 
document not only to emphasize the pre-eminent role of  national  authorities 
in the implementation of R2P, but also to call for international assistance that 
strengthens state capacity, reinforces sovereignty and respects different national 
‘paths’ to implementing R2P.78 Some states have also pursued this statist inter-
pretation of R2P by attempting to inject a notion of hierarchy into the norm’s 
prescriptions, challenging the Secretary-General’s claim that the pillars are of 
equal weight, mutually reinforcing and non-sequential.79 Assembly discussions 
of R2P, particularly between 2014 and 2018, feature statements insisting that R2P 
is first and foremost a national responsibility, and that the role of the international 
community is always secondary.80
In a similar fashion, several states, including a number of TCCs, have increas-
ingly framed their support for PoC in the C34 with reference to those activities 
that fall under tiers 1 and 3 of the DPKO’s expanded framework. They maintain 
that PoC is the primary responsibility of the state, affirm the continued impor-
tance of consent, and stress that the UN should pursue protection through 
unarmed strategies and support for the state and political processes.81 These same 
states have resisted the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians,82 opposed 
initiatives that seek to strengthen accountability mechanisms for implementation 
of PoC mandates,83 and pushed forward the ‘force protection’ agenda to highlight 
the risks faced by peacekeepers themselves.84 Although these interpretations do 
not amount to a frontal assault on either R2P or PoC, they arguably represent 
a conscious attempt to reshape the meaning of both norms through a form of 
‘constructive’ discursive contestation.
76 Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel and Mario Tourinho, ‘The impact of Libyan intervention debates on 
norms of protection’, Global Society 30: 1, 2016, pp. 113–33. 
77 For further discussion of the negotiations, see Welsh, ‘Norm robustness’. 
78 See e.g. statements by China, Egypt, India and Morocco in the 2016 General Assembly dialogue, http://www.
globalr2p.org/resources/897.
79 Implementing the responsibility to protect, A/63/677; Mobilizing collective action: the next decade of the Responsibility to 
Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/999 (New York: UN, 2016).
80 See esp. the comments of Cuba, Egypt and Venezuela at the thematic event of the President of the General 
Assembly on the Responsibility to Protect, 26 Feb. 2016: for a summary of statements, see http://www.
globalr2p.org/resources/897.
81 See e.g. statements by India, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal and Thailand in the C34 annual meeting of 2016: GA/
PK/223, 16 Feb. 2016, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/gapk223.doc.htm. 
82 Author’s telephone interview with western diplomat, Aug. 2018.
83 ‘UN asked to punish peacekeepers who don’t protect civilians’, Associated Press, 31 July 2018.
84 UN, Improving security of United Nations peacekeepers (New York, 19 Dec. 2017).
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What is more, phase III has been marked by various forms of behavioural 
contestation. While advances have been made at the national level to assist with 
implementation of R2P’s first pillar, including the National Focal Point initiative,85 
there has been a decline in the use of specific R2P language in deliberations within 
the Security Council regarding several critical cases where atrocity crimes have 
been committed or are imminent. During the crisis of 2015–2016 in Burundi, 
which resulted in widespread human rights violations and systematic killing, 
some Security Council members (including Russia) insisted that the situation 
was ‘political’ and that R2P was irrelevant.86 They pursued behavioural contesta-
tion by opposing any consideration of deploying a UN force under Chapter VII 
and blocked the inclusion of R2P language in the resolution that was eventually 
tabled.87 In the case of Syria, political deadlock within the Security Council over 
the legitimacy of international efforts to address the violence meant that states 
initially responded by pursuing independent rather than collective action—for 
example, through sanctions by the Arab League, EU and United States. The first 
Security Council resolution on the situation in Syria, passed in 2014, was limited 
to a demand that parties to the conflict allow delivery of humanitarian assis-
tance.88 While that resolution—along with subsequent Council decisions89—did 
invoke pillar one by reminding government authorities of their responsibility to 
protect the Syrian population, it did not articulate any international responsibilities 
associated with R2P. More recently, the Security Council was notably reticent 
on the situation in Myanmar, limiting its formal response—despite warnings by 
senior UN officials that attacks by state security forces against the Rohingya might 
constitute genocide—to the adoption of a presidential statement stressing the 
‘primary responsibility of the Myanmar government to protect its population’.90 
Given that a key normative prescription for the international community in R2P 
is a ‘duty of conduct’, the absence of deliberation and response across these cases 
is significant evidence of behavioural contestation.
Behavioural contestation with respect to PoC has also increased in this most 
recent phase. Although missions intensified their involvement in a wide range of 
protection activities that fall under tiers 1 and 3, and demonstrated ingenuity in 
developing various protection tools,91 peacekeepers seldom used force to protect 
civilians in imminent danger.92 In its review of eight missions, the UN Office 
85 Over 60 states have appointed focal points within national governments to coordinate policy development 
on atrocity crime prevention and response: http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/global_network_of_r2p_
focal_points.
86 Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Troels Gauslå Engell, ‘Conflict prevention as a pragmatic response to a twofold 
crisis: liberal interventionism and Burundi’, International Affairs 94: 2, March 2018, pp. 363–80; Louise Riis 
Andersen, ‘The HIPPO in the room: the pragmatic push-back from the UN peace bureaucracy against the 
militarization of UN peacebuilding’, International Affairs 94: 2, March 2018, pp. 343–62.
87 S/RES/2248, 12 Nov. 2015. See also Welsh, ‘Norm robustness’. 
88 S/RES/2139, 22 Feb. 2014. Previous draft resolutions proposing more robust action, including sanctions, were 
vetoed.
89 S/RES/2165, 14 July 2014; S/RES/2254, 18 Dec. 2015; S/RES/2258, 22 Dec. 2015; S/RES/2332, 21 Dec. 2016. 
90 SC/13055, 6 Nov. 2017. 
91 Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, A/68/787 (New York: UN, 7 March 2014), p. 6.
92 When and where force has been used by peacekeepers (e.g. by the Force Intervention Brigade in the Congo 
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of Internal Oversight Services uncovered a ‘persistent pattern’ of peacekeeper 
passivity in which ‘force was almost never used’ to protect civilians.93 Similarly, 
the 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) lamented 
that the vast increases in resources, research and policy guidelines on PoC have ‘yet 
to transform reality on the ground, where it matters’.94
Failure to implement the more forceful provisions of PoC mandates is in a 
sense hardly surprising, reflecting as it does what the HIPPO panel found to be 
a ‘lack of consensus’ among member states over PoC.95 Different and conflicting 
views persist about what constitutes ‘imminent threat of physical violence’, 
whether and when force can be used against elements of the host government, 
and how TCCs should assume the risks associated with the use of force. These 
concerns and different interpretations are manifest in what UN officials describe 
as the increasing prevalence of national caveats, creating a de facto dual line of 
command. In several mission contexts, the advice offered from TCC capitals has 
conflicted with directives issued by senior mission officials. While TCCs lack the 
necessary power and access to realize their preferred conception of the norm at 
headquarters, caveats—as a form of behavioural contestation—attest to the fact 
that, as those primarily putting application of the norm into practice, TCCs have 
a certain degree of implementation access and autonomy at the field level. 
The shift towards a more state-centric conceptualization of PoC and R2P, and 
increased behavioural contestation that dilutes the imperative for collective action 
to protect, are worrying signs of a less hospitable political environment for the 
advancement of these norms. The dynamics of dissent captured in this third phase 
thus point to the resilience of other powerful ‘pluralist’ norms—such as sovereign 
equality, national ownership, non-interference and consent—that are enjoying 
renewed consensus in an era of resurgent nationalism.96 Nevertheless, it is too 
soon to proclaim the demise of these two protection norms, or of the normative 
impulse that contributed to their creation and continues to motivate a set of state 
and non-state actors. The 2015 HIPPO report’s call for a more ‘people-centred’ 
approach to peacekeeping, and the prioritization of ‘people’ in Secretary-General 
Guterres’s 2018 ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ initiative, can be viewed as the Secretari-
at’s latest attempts to foster consensus on the continued need to protect individuals 
and to close the gap between stated ambition and actual practice. Similarly, the 
successful move to place R2P on the formal agenda of the General Assembly in 
2017 and 2018, as opposed to maintaining an informal dialogue, illustrates that 
there remains a broad and cross-regional grouping of states still committed to its 
implementation within and beyond the UN.
Finally, it is worth noting some recent concrete efforts to bring the two norms 
closer together at the field level. One example is a training programme, led by the 
or AMISOM in Somalia), regional interests have played a significant role. See Paddon Rhoads, Taking sides 
in peacekeeping. 
93 Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandate, p. 1. 
94 Uniting our strengths for peace, para. 82. 
95 Uniting our strengths for peace, para. 82.
96 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Power transitions, global justice and the virtues of pluralism’, Ethics and International Affairs 
27: 2, 2013, pp. 189–205.
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Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, aimed at enhancing the capacity 
of peacekeepers to identify and respond to the warning signs of atrocity crimes.97 
For advocates of R2P, this initiative reflects the pragmatic recognition that peace 
operations and stabilization missions, which—unlike the 2011 Libya mission—
operate with the consent of the host state, are likely to be the major multilateral 
context in which military means are used to protect populations. For those in 
the peacekeeping community, the project is an acknowledgement that existing 
training on PoC requires more sophisticated and dynamic threat assessments, and 
that clearer operational guidance on protection for TCCs is required prior to 
deployment.
Assessing the dynamics of dissent on protection
Our comparative examination of the nature, evolution and contestation of R2P 
and PoC underscores the value of considering how norms work together, or are 
consciously used in juxtaposition. It stands to reason that, as social facts, norms 
rarely operate in isolation. The stories of the two protection norms have been 
intertwined—in some cases through the involvement of the same individual norm 
entrepreneurs, or sceptical member states, but also because contestation has been 
manifest in the choice to invoke one norm rather than the other. 
As we have shown, UN staff have at times consciously sought to separate R2P 
from the PoC concerns of peacekeepers, predominantly out of fear that equating 
the two norms would foster resistance to the advancement of PoC. Individual 
states have also engaged in the strategy of dissociation. Australia and Uruguay, for 
example, clearly distinguished PoC from R2P when organizing the workshops 
that served as precursors to the introduction of PoC into the C34;98 and some 
member states have deliberately used the language of PoC rather than R2P in their 
contributing statements to General Assembly informal dialogues. Even Canada, 
one of the early promoters of R2P, deliberately avoided invoking the norm in 
justifying its involvement in the Libya bombing in 2011, preferring instead to 
proclaim its ‘resolve to protect civilians’.99 Since 2011, even with the more statist 
elements of R2P in the ascendant, some diplomats describe R2P ‘talk’ in the 
context of peacekeeping as ‘toxic’, and to be avoided ‘at all cost’.100 
Our analysis of the dynamics of contestation also reveals the importance of 
considering which actors contest norms, and where they do so. We have suggested 
that, despite the origins—and prominence—of R2P and PoC in the UN, indi-
viduals within the Secretariat have discursively contested both norms at different 
points, mainly out of a concern for institutional legitimacy. In the case of R2P, the 
97 Information about the programme, sponsored by the government of Canada, can be found at http://www.
globalr2p.org/our_work/peacekeeping_and_civilian_protection.
98 Angus Francis and Vesselin Popovski, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians: a view 
from the United Nations’, in Francis et al., eds, Norms of protection, pp. 88–9.
99 See Mark Kersten, ‘The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is faltering. Here’s why’, Monkey Cage, 8 Dec. 
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/08/the-responsibility-to-protect-
doctrine-is-failing-heres-why/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2a08161262cd.
100 Author’s telephone interview with western diplomat, Aug. 2018.
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General Assembly, open as it is to the participation of all UN members, has from 
the outset been the primary site for discursive contestation among states. Attempts 
to discuss R2P within the Security Council have enabled states sceptical about the 
norm, such as Russia, to engage in behavioural contestation through its voting and, 
given the limited membership of this body, to wield disproportionate influence on 
decision-making. With respect to PoC, behavioural contestation at the field level 
in phases II and III has been shaped by TCCs’ lack of access, at headquarters and 
within the Council, to realize their preferred understanding of the norm. 
Finally, our study illuminates several elements of Stimmer and Wisken’s frame-
work for understanding norm contestation and highlights areas of potential theo-
retical refinement. First, the analysis supports the assertion that implementation 
access, particularly when accompanied by weak access to deliberative and deci-
sion-making bodies, increases the likelihood that an actor will pursue behavioural 
contestation. Second, we have shown how the ambiguity surrounding the obliga-
tions that underpin both norms, as well as the lack of clear authority or responsi-
bility for their implementation, may increase an actor’s proclivity for behavioural 
contestation. With respect to PoC, this has resulted in increasingly robust peace-
keeping mandates, yet little change in PoC practice at the field level. Turning to 
R2P, we see behavioural contestation in the failure of states to fulfil their ‘duty of 
conduct’, exemplified by a lack of deliberation on situations where atrocities have 
occurred or are imminent. Third, we have demonstrated how other ambiguities 
surrounding both norms contribute to contestation, by enabling actors to debate 
which norm applies in a given situation, or to draw on one or more pillars or tiers 
to emphasize their preferred interpretation of what action the norms prescribe. 
The latter aspect of norm ambiguity, which draws on the inherent flexibility of 
norms, has also had an ‘upside’: it has proved crucial in keeping both norms alive. 
In the words of one western diplomat: ‘The three-tier conceptualization of PoC 
has allowed the norm to continue to exist. We would not be having a conversation 
about PoC, if it was solely about physical protection.’101 The same could be said 
about R2P’s three-pillar framework. The consensus that protection from atrocity 
crimes involves national, regional and international efforts, and that prevention is 
at the core of R2P, has widened implementation access to a variety of institutions 
and organizations, and has diluted the impact of contestation over the use of mili-
tary means. As a consequence, despite strategies that seek to set them apart, the 
two norms of R2P and PoC, these ‘close cousins’, today have similar structures, 
strengths and vulnerabilities. They are also both experiencing a disjuncture between 
macro-level institutionalization and inconsistent or inadequate implementation. 
Conclusions
The development of the two norms of R2P and PoC, and their interrelation-
ship, continue to be shaped by failure: failure to consider situations as requiring 
concerted international action; failure to respond in a timely and decisive fashion 
101 Author’s telephone interview with western diplomat, Aug. 2018.
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to protection crises; and failure to fully implement what mandates prescribe.102 As 
we have suggested, while some of these failures represent deficiencies in capacity 
and political will, some have also been shaped by behavioural contestation of the 
two norms, as states ‘act out’ their dissent by blocking or hampering efforts to 
protect populations. 
On the PoC side, some might argue that this failure can actually be produc-
tive, given the norm’s more operational focus. The UN’s willingness to be trans-
parent and frank about what has gone wrong in past peace operations also presents 
opportunities for the organization to bring member states together in efforts to 
improve doctrine and practice.103 With respect to R2P, the impact of failure works 
in different and more complex ways. At the micro level, efforts to build state 
capacity to protect and to address risk factors leading to atrocity crimes are a 
powerful, if less visible, testament to the commitment to learn from past failures. 
But at the macro level, inaction in the face of war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity—a quarter of a century after their perpetration in Rwanda and 
Srebrenica—raises doubts among some about the utility of a political principle, 
despite its unanimous endorsement in 2005, particularly in an international 
environment where unity among the major powers continues to prove so elusive. 
102 Rebecca Sanders, ‘Norm spoiling: undermining the women’s rights agenda’, International Affairs 94: 2, March 
2018, pp. 271–92.
103 See e.g. The executive summary of the independent special investigation into the violence in Juba in 2016, S/2016/924 (New 
York: UN, 1 Nov. 2016).
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